What are moral values? A definition.

In my last post on my secularized Jewish ethics project I proposed a pluralistic model where different communities, with different values, can fit under a Jewish ethical framework,

But I am also trying to position Jewish ethics as a universal grammar where communities who have different values can intelligently debate each others' ideas. If a community defines their values radically differently than another, how can they respect each other when their values are radically different?

Stepping back, I realized that even the definition of "values" is not so clear.

In Aristotelian virtue ethics, moral virtues include courage, wittiness and patience. But are those values moral? A suicide bomber shows courage. A terrorist can show much patience while planning an attack. The best con artists are very witty.

Perhaps we need to distinguish between ethics and morality. Ethics, as I understand it, can be any self-consistent, cohesive decision making framework. That is why Marxism, revolutionary ethics and even Mafia codes of conduct are ethical - they are consistent and cohesive systems.

But they are not moral.

Morality is an ethical system that is objectively good - that promotes human dignity, justice, and life,

Aristotle's virtue ethics is certainly ethical - but it is not necessarily moral. His virtues are attributes that can be used for good or bad. Having those attributes does not make a person virtuous, in the sense that the word is used today.

So I would argue that those virtues are not real moral values.

Similarly, I excluded from my secular Jewish ethics framework ostensibly positive ideas like "peace" and "love." They may be nice sentiments, but they are not really actionable or practical as means to help a person make decisions. Sometimes war is necessary for peace and love can be manifested by sternness.

So what, exactly, is a value?

Using Jewish thinking as my guide, I came up with this definition:

A true moral value must result in an ethically meaningful transformation - of the self, of relationships, or of the world. If a claimed value does not catalyze change in alignment with structured moral responsibility, it is not a value at all.

Vague terms like "authenticity," "empowerment" and "strength" are not moral values because they are not tied to moral good. But beyond that, values must be tied to responsibility.

Transformation is not enough. A moral value must also impose responsibility. That’s what distinguishes it from raw preference or sentiment.

In Jewish ethics, nearly every moral value is expressed through obligation:

• Pikuach nefesh (preserving life) isn’t an ideal—it’s a duty to act.

• Emet (truth) isn’t just being honest—it’s a binding obligation to seek and uphold truth, even when inconvenient.

• Teshuvah (repentance) is moral not because it “feels right,” but because it transforms one into becoming a better person, which is in fact an obligation everyone has to themselves.

Even internal transformation counts—as long as it binds the self in covenantal responsibility. You are obligated to become someone better. That’s the core of teshuvah, repentance. Jewish ethics values not just what you do, but who you are becoming—and how that transformation enables you to better serve others.

This definition is important because we live in a time where moral language has become a weapon, Words like “freedom,” “equity,” or “justice” are invoked without serious definition, without structure, without accountability, and without clarity.

My framework offers a grammar - a set of criteria - to ask:

• Does this “value” produce ethical transformation?

• Does it impose responsibility on someone to act or become better?

• Is it embedded in a moral structure that prioritizes life, dignity, and justice?

If not, it’s not a moral value.

It might be a feeling, a branding strategy, or a political posture. But it is not morality.

It is interesting to read Rambam (Maimonides) as he describes Aristotelian values. He describes virtues and the golden mean, but he doesn't stop there - he ties these attributes to acting like God, imitaio Dei. They are not moral values without being connected to the source of all moral good. And of course Rambam's Mishneh Torah is oriented around real obligations - mitzvot - not cultivation of character traits. Those traits are precursors to action and transformational change.

It is not unreasonable to ask other systems to translate their values into this structure. We don’t have to demand conformity—but we can demand clarity. Maybe “rights” isn’t a value—but states and communities are obligated to protect dignity and freedom. That’s the translation. That’s the grammar.

The goal of ethics is not self-expression.
The goal of ethics is transformation for the good.

Everything else is commentary.